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RIGHT-To-DIE DAMAGE ACTIONS: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE LAW
By DAVID H. MILLER, ESQ.*
This note traces the history of the "right-to-die" damage action.
These are cases in which health care providers have been sued for pro-
viding unwanted life-sustaining treatment. After briefly describing the
development of basic right-to-die law, the principle theories behind
damage claims and the cases themselves are discussed, and the primary
stumbling blocks are analyzed.
I. RIGHT-TO-DIE CASES AND THE POSITION OF HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
Fifteen years ago right-to-die lawsuits were infrequently encoun-
tered. What cases could be found generally involved religiously moti-
vated refusals of blood transfusions.' However, today right-to-die
lawsuits are becoming more commonplace. Most often these new cases
involve demands for the removal of life-sustaining treatment, typically
respirators or feeding tubes. Approximately one half of the states have
decisions dealing with demands for the termination of life-sustaining
treatment. 2 These cases run the gamut from competent adult non-ter-
minal patients personally asserting their rights,3 to family members or
friends insisting that permanently vegetative or otherwise severely dis-
abled patients be taken off life-support.4 The majority of these cases
seek court orders directing uncertain or unwilling health care providers
simply to turn off the machines.
The fact that these issues frequently arise should come as no sur-
prise. In our society death has become a matter for negotiation between
doctor, patient and family. For eighty percent of Americans death oc-
curs while hospitalized. 5 It is estimated that 5,000 to 10,000 patients are
* Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado. B.A.
1973, Duke University; J.D. 1977, University of Denver.
1. See Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Pre-
vail?, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, The Right of a Patient To Refuse Blood Transfusions: A
Dilemma of Conscience and Law For Patient, 3 U. S. F. V. L. REV. 91 (1974).
2. See Society for the Right to Die, Right to Die Court Decisions (1988) (available at
250 W. 57th St., New York, NY 10107).
3. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986) (successful petition for removal of feeding tube).
4. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986) (spouse successfully petitioned for removal of feeding tube from husband in persis-
tent vegetative state); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 469 (1987) (friend successfully
petitioned for guardianship and order removing feeding tube).
5. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND Bio-
MEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
A REPORT OF THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 17-18
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
maintained in some kind of vegetative state while tens of thousands
more receive life-support in the form of respirator treatment or artificial
nutrition and hydration through tubes inserted into their bodies. Under
these circumstances, it is surprising that more cases do not result in liti-
gation. 6 Were there an established set of rules to guide these negotia-
tions fewer problems might arise. To that end, some thirty-nine states
have "living will" or "natural death" statutes. 7 These laws permit a per-
son to provide a binding instructions to health care providers concern-
ing the use of life-sustaining treatment in cases of later incompetency.
As more and more of the population utilizes these statutes, and as judi-
cial decisions clarify existing uncertainties, the law and medical practices
involving life-sustaining treatment will stabilize.8 That time, however,
has not come.9
6. As the boundaries of medical technology expand and the mean population age
increases, the most important issue may well become the right of access to life-sustaining
treatment in the face of scarce resources. See PRESIDENr's COMM'N, supra note 5, at 98-100.
7. See Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1983); Alaska
Act Relating to the Rights of the Terminally Ill, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986);
Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(1985); Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, 1987 Ark.
Acts 713; California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West
1988); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113
(1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504-a (West 1986); Delaware Death with Dignity Act,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of
1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1987); Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act,
FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01-.15 (1986); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -
12 (1985); Hawaii Act, 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 338; Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras.
701-710 (Smith-Hurd 1987); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act,
IND. CODE § 16-8-11 (1985); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IowA CODE §§ 144A.l-
.11 (1985); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101-09 (1979); Louisiana
Life-Sustaining Procedures 2A, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4D:1299.58.1-.10 (1984); Maine
Living Wills Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 10a (1985); Maryland Life-Sustaining Pro-
cedures, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1985); Mississippi Natural Death
Act, MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1984); Missouri Death-Prolonging Proce-
dures Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (1985); Montana Living Will Act, Morr. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, 50-9-111, 50-9-201 to -206 (1985); Nevada Withholding of Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 44g.540-690 (1977); New Hampshire Liv-
ing Wills Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137H (1985); New Mexico Right To Die Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1978); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1977); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§§ 3101-3111 (1985); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 97.050-.090 (1977); South Carolina Death With Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-
10-160 (1986); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1 1-101 to -
111 (1983); Texas Natural Death Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon 1977);
Utah Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1985); Ver-
mont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, tit. 13, § 1801
(1982); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1-13 (1983); Washington
Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (1979); West Virginia Nat-
ural Death Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1984); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis.
STAT. § 154.01 (1984); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wvo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (1984).
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117 (1987).
8. Hospitals will soon be forced to address life-sustaining treatment issues whether
they wish to or not. In its 1989 Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Hospitals is requiring that hospitals have in place a policy gov-
erning implementation of "Do Not Resuscitate" orders. PERSPEcTIVES, Jan. 1988.
9. A recent physician poll conducted in Colorado discloses disturbing information.
Twenty-four percent of all doctors surveyed were unfamiliar with the state's three-year old
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There are general rules known to those who deal with bioethical
issues. Yet the nostrum that a competent adult has the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment is of little help when competency is dis-
puted, when someone is never competent to make their own decision, or
when an incompetent without a living will is the focus of attention.
Moreover, many institutions have no policies governing how to termi-
nate, let alone when to terminate, treatment.10 In the absence of wide-
spread policies and commonly accepted principles, and in light of the
ability of medical technology to maintain the mechanics of life long after
death would otherwise occur, it is no wonder that the courts have be-
come deeply involved in right-to-die issues. "1
The courts do not look forward to involvement in right-to-die cases.
The vast majority of opinions make it clear that treatment decisions ide-
ally should be made by patients and families in conjunction with health
care providers under legislatively formulated guidelines. 12 Only a small
minority of jurisdictions encourage judicial involvement in approving
certain treatment termination procedures.' 3 The fact is that scores of
patients are taken off life-support every day without court
involvement. 14
The right to be free from such treatment may seem to have sprung
up quickly over the last dozen years. 15 In fact, common law rights to
bodily integrity and freedom from medically invasive procedures have a
long history. 16 As a result of the general recognition of these rights the
overwhelming majority of cases result in a court order directing the ces-
sation of treatment. 17 For competent adult patients the right is clear
living will statute. CENTER FOR HEALTH, ETHICS AND POLICY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUB.
AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF DENVER, WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
A SURVEY OF OPINIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF COLORADO PHYSICIANS 10 (1988).
10. See, e.g., Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346
(1988) (failure to have policy for procedure to terminate life-sustaining treatment is not
negligence). However, some health care facilities have developed their own procedures
and policies. See, e.g., Carlson, Derich & Frank, Development of a Comprehensive Supportive Care
Team for the Hopelessly Ill on a University Hospital Medical Service, 259 J. A.M.A. 378 (1988).
11. A review of right to die cases and law is outside the scope of this note. The best
capsule summaries are provided inJ.W. SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY § 13 (Supp. 1987) and
M.G. MACDONALD, K.C. MEYER & B. ESSIG, HEALTH CARE LAw: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 18
(Supp. 1987).
12. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 338, 529 A.2d 404, 407-08 (1987) (calling for legis-
lative guidelines).
13. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
458 U.S. 858 (1981).
14. See In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 341 n.4 (Minn. 1984) (Ten life-support systems
are disconnected weekly in Minnesota without court involvement.).
15. Recent cases include In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom.
Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), the landmark case which upheld a par-
ent/guardian's right to refuse life-sustaining (respirator) treatment for his daughter who
lay in a permanent vegetative state. The Quinlan holding was modified by In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
16. See Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right To Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of
Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 628 (1986).
17. Only on very rare occasions have courts refused to approve a termination order.
In New Mexico v. Fort, No. 14768 (N.M. 1983), the court found no authority in the New
Mexico Right To Die Act ("Act") to terminate the treatment of an incompetent without a
prior directive. This decision was quickly reversed by the state legislature which amended
1988]
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and fundamental.' 8 For patients becoming incompetent or who were
never competent, the right is becoming ever more clearly established, so
long as family members in good faith agree, and there is little chance for
significant patient improvement from a terminal or vegetative
condition. 19
Health care providers have generally taken the position that, in
cases of disagreement, it is the patient's obligation to go to court and
obtain the order for termination of treatment. While the case law indi-
cates a few instances where doctors or hospitals have gone into court
first,20 the more usual situation involves a patient or family member who
petitions the court. Why this has been so is easy to understand. The
health care industry is particularly sensitive to the potential for liability
claims. Until a few years ago, health care providers may have had more
reason to fear not only civil but also criminal penalties for failing to pro-
vide life-sustaining treatment. In Barber v. Superior Court of the State of
California two California doctors were charged with murder after they
bowed to family requests and withdrew life support. 2 1 However, the de-
cision in Barber clearly established that health care providers in Califor-
nia need not continue "useless" therapy and that no criminal liability
would result so long as the usual standards of the profession were not
violated. 2 2 No cases since have found to the contrary, and no cases have
been found where a doctor's termination of life support resulted in even
civil liability.
2 3
If health care providers face any real danger it is that continuation
of unwanted treatment may itself result in liability. 24 Given the compe-
tent patient's right to refuse treatment and the more recently developed
right for family members to refuse treatment for incompetents, health
care providers might be advised to go to court themselves if they disa-
gree with an order to cease treatment. Certainly, almost any court
would grant a preliminary order allowing the continuation of treatment,
pending a full hearing on allegations challenging the patient's compe-
the Act to allow physician termination of life-sustaining treatment if family members agree
that the patient would have wished treatment to stop. 1984 N.M. Laws ch.99, § 6 (codified
as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Supp. 1986)). See also Newman v. Beaumont Army Medical
Center, No. EP 86 CA 276 (W.D.Tex. Oct. 30, 1986) (evidence of isolated statement of
intent is insufficient to establish patient wishes, and so treatment must continue).
18. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137-38, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 300-01 (Ct. App. 1986).
19. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (never competent patient in terminal condition); In reJobes, 108
N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987) (incompetent patient in persistent vegetative state).
20. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct.
1987); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d. 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
21. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
22. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
23. In one case, a surviving family member sued health care providers for withdraw-
ing treatment without a written directive. The case was dismissed. Camp v. White, 501
So. 2d 166, 169-70 (Ala. 1987). See also Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa Ct. App.
1987) (incompetent patient's spouse has no cause of action against doctors who withheld
life support without spouse's consent).
24. See Cohen, Civil Liability for Providing Unwanted Life Support, 2 BioIAw 499 (1987).
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tency or asserting that the wishes of the family were in conflict. 25 How-
ever, such has not been the practice. Health care providers generally
seem to have taken a passive position, requiring patients or families to
make the first move. Given developments in the law that tack may not
be so wise today.
II. RIGHT-To-DIE DAMAGE ACTIONS
The 1980's saw the first attempts to impose civil liability upon
health care providers for the failure to terminate life-sustaining treat-
ment. Few of these cases have been successful. In some, the courts have
stated that the individual's rights were not clearly enough defined to es-
tablish liability. 26 In others, the courts found that the duty of the doctor
was not clear.2 7 Such statements suggest that as the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment becomes more clear, the potential for civil liability
for refusing to respect termination demands will grow. 28 While gener-
ally so far having been unsuccessful, as a group these cases point in the
direction in which the plaintiffs' bar, if not yet the law, is moving.
A. The Precursors
1. In re Spring
2 9
One of the earliest cases to discuss the civil liability issue was In re
Spring. Decided four years after Quinlan, it involved an incompetent 70-
year old patient suffering from organic brain syndrome and end-stage
kidney disease and undergoing hemodialysis. While continued treat-
ment possibly could have prolonged his life for up to five years, there
was no hope of any improvement. The son, who had been appointed
temporary guardian, petitioned, along with the spouse, for an order ter-
minating treatment. A guardian ad litem was appointed and the case
worked its tortured way through the courts. One month after the pa-
tient died, while still undergoing hemodialysis, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision.
3 0
25. Practical suggestions for health care providers and their attorneys are in a short
supply. An excellent resource, however, is M. MACDONALD, K. MEYER & B. ESSIG, HEALTH
CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 18 (1987).
26. See, e.g., Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d 961,
969, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363 (Ct. App. 1986).
27. See, e.g., McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.J. Super. 502, 506, 524 A.2d
450, 452 (App. Div. 1987).
28. For a discussion of the theoretical basis for such claims see Oddi, supra note 16,
and Comment, Damage Actions For Nonconsensual Life-Sustaining Treatment, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J.
895 (1986). See also Cohen, supra note 24.
29. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
30. The son's guardianship petition was filed in November, 1978. Appointment was
made in January, 1979. The parties immediately petitioned to terminate life-sustaining
treatment. The probate court appointed a guardian ad litem who filed a report in Febru-
ary, 1979. A hearing was held in April and the judge issued his opinion in May, 1979. The
order was stayed. An appeal was filed and a new probate court order was issued in July,
1979. The case was argued in the Massachusetts Supreme Court in January, 1980 and
decided that same month by order initially reversing and remanding the case back to the
probate court for further hearings. In April, 1980 Mr. Spring died while still being treated.
1988]
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The court upheld the family's order to stop treatment, recognizing
that "substituted judgment" decisions made on an incompetent's behalf
should control if they both reflect what the patient would want if he were
competent, and if the patient's interest in self determination outweighed
the state's interests. 31 The Court went on to list ten general factors
which would control the issue of whether a court order was necessary in
such cases. While making it clear that judicial intervention was not al-
ways needed, it was found to be appropriate here, especially given the
uncertainty in the state of the law.3 2 In reviewing that law, the court in
dicta addressed the issue of civil liability. While recognizing that treating
competent patients against their will would result in a battery, the court
had more problem with that analysis when applied to incompetents.
3 3
This limitation is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the court's earlier
finding that a "person has a strong interest in being free from noncon-
sensual invasion of his bodily integrity, and a constitutional right of pri-
vacy that may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily
integrity."' 34 The only way this limitation of the right of incompetents
can be explained is to emphasize the medical profession's strong parens
patriae position toward incompetents, regardless of the assertion of the
incompetent's rights by family or guardians.
2. Foster v. Tourtellotte
3 5
The case of Foster v. Tourtellotte appears to have been the first re-
ported case directly related to a damage claim in a right-to-die case. It
involved a competent patient's withdrawal of consent to respiratory
treatment. He had been dependent on such treatment for almost a year.
When the hospital and doctors refused to stop the machine, Foster sued,
not only for an injunction but for damages and attorneys fees as well .
The lower court granted the injunction on the ground that Foster's
"constitutional rights of privacy and dignity" were being violated.3 6
The injunction was stayed pending appeal, but Foster died before the
order became effective or an appeal was taken.
In May, 1980 the Supreme Court issued its final written opinion affirming the probate
court decision. Id. at 632-33, 405 N.E.2d at 117-18. While the courts moved conscien-
tiously, this case serves as an example of how judicial involvement--especially in the ear-
lier right to die cases-could lead to lengthy and troublesome delays.
31. Id. at 634,405 N.E.2d at 120. Typically, the courts have identified four state inter-
ests in continuing life-sustaining treatment: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide;
(3) protecting incompetents and dependent third parties; and (4) protecting the integrity
of the medical profession. These interests are then balanced against the patient's right to
refuse treatment. Oddi, supra note 16, at 632-35. Given the facts, in some cases the strong-
est state interest is protecting third parties. Id. at 635. In Spring, the court identified the
preservation of life as the primary state interest. Spring at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119. These
four state interests were first set out by the same court in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977), and have been widely
cited ever since. See PRESIDENr's COMM'N, supra note 5, at 31-32.
32. Spring at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 121-22.
33. Id. at 638, 405 N.E.2d at 119.
34. Id.
35. 704 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983).
36. Id. at 1110.
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Subsequently, the plaintiff's damages action for violation of Fos-
ter's constitutional right to privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 198337 was volun-
tarily dismissed with prejudice and the motion for attorney's fees was
denied by the district court in an unpublished opinion. The reported
opinion, while referring to the district court's dismissal of the damage
action, only addresses whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying Foster's fee application under the Equal Access to Justice Act.3 8
The Ninth Circuit, however, found that, even if one assumed an ab-
solute constitutional privacy right to refuse treatment, the government
had acted reasonably in requiring a court order.3 9 The court held that
Foster's request for an injunction raised troublesome and disturbing
questions in a matter quite literally of life and death. Also "the govern-
ment faced a complete absence of helpful precedent in the Supreme
Court or the courts of appeal on the application of the right to privacy to
a patient's desire to terminate life sustaining treatment."'40 No fees were
awarded.
3. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital
4 1
In this case a competent 71 year-old terminal cancer patient in re-
spiratory distress petitioned the court, through her son, for an order
terminating use of a respirator. Army policy precluded withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment once placed in operation. Relying on the con-
stitutional right to privacy for a competent's refusal of unwanted medi-
cal treatment, the court granted the petition and Mrs. Tune's respirator
was disconnected.
4 2
In discussing the precedents, the court acknowledged the "well-es-
tablished rule of general law" that a competent patient, not the physi-
cian, is the one who decides whether treatment is to be given.43 To
support this proposition the court cited to a case involving a damage
action for medical negligence and breach of informed consent require-
37. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986), states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
38. Foster, 704 F.2d at 1111-12. The Equal Access to Justice Act requires a court to
award fees to a prevailing party in non-tort cases unless the position of the United States
was substantially justified. Fees may also be denied if "special circumstances make an
award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (Supp. 1987). While Foster did not prevail on his
damage claim he did receive the requested injunction. That served as the basis for the fee
request. 704 F.2d at 1112-13.
39. Foster, 704 F.2d at 1112. Foster's wife and one of his children opposed his wish
and even Foster had equivocated on his decision during hospitalization. Id. at 1110.
40. Id. at 1113.
41. 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
42. Id. at 1456.
43. Id. at 1455.
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ments.44 This can be read as an indication that breach of a physician's
duty in right-to-die cases could result in a damage award under negli-
gence or informed consent doctrines.
4 5
The three decisions in Spring, Foster and Tune provide only the
barest of support for later right-to-die damage actions. Spring hinted at
the possibility of civil liability but shied away from applying traditional
battery analysis to such an area. Foster had actually included a damage
claim under civil rights law. However, that privacy-based claim was vol-
untarily dismissed at the trial level and the appellate court never reached
the issue. Further, in denying plaintiff's fee motion the court made it
clear that the law was so uncertain at the time that no established right
of the plaintiff supported an award. Finally, while Tune tacitly acknowl-
edged the potential for damage claims in right-to-die cases, the issue
was not presented to the court by the pleadings. The importance of the
court's citation to common medical malpractice cases in dicta is therefore
difficult to assess.
B. Right-to-die Damage Actions
Lack of a clearly developed line of precedent makes the first case
examined in this section all the more significant. The case arose in a
state with no right-to-die precedent, except the lower court decision in
the same case.
1. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro
46
This is the first case which resulted in a damage recovery through
settlement in the context of a right-to-die action. In Leach, the estate
and family of a woman who was hospitalized while suffering from amyo-
trophic lateral sclerosis (ALS or "Lou Gehrig's disease," a terminal ill-
ness for which there is no treatment) sued her hospital and attending
physician for placing and maintaining Mrs. Leach on life support against
the wishes of herself and her family. Previously, a successful action had
been brought to obtain an order terminating life sustaining treatment.
The order was based on the constitutional right to privacy in refusing
unwanted medical care. 4 7 The defendants in the subsequent damage
action moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
might be granted. The trial court granted the motion.
48
The complaint pled five causes of action: (1) the estate's claim to
44. Id. at 1455 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (action against
surgeon and hospital for paralysis resulting from back operation without adequate disclo-
sure of risks), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)).
45. Where treatment is performed without consent the appropriate tort model is bat-
tery, not negligence. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972) (en banc). Medical battery claims have a recognized place in American tort law. See,
e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
46. 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
47. Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (Ct. Com.
P1. 1980).
48. Estate of Leach, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 393, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.
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recover medical expenses totalling over $60,000 for treatment without
consent; (2) the estate's claim that Mrs. Leach's constitutional right to
privacy was violated; (3) the estate's claim that Mrs. Leach was subjected
to pain and suffering; (4) the family members' individual claims that the
hospital and doctor had wrongfully subjected them to mental pain and
suffering; and (5) the plaintiffs' collective claim for punitive damages. 4 9
The court of appeals noted that the dismissal could only be upheld
if, from the pleadings, it appeared beyond doubt that the plaintiffs could
prove no set of facts entitling them to relief.50 Applying this test the
court reversed and reinstated the case. The court made it clear at the
outset that treatment without consent constituted a battery even though
the procedure might be harmless or beneficial. 5 1 Additionally, the court
stressed the importance of informed consent and held that failure to
disclose under appropriate circumstances could constitute fraud.
52
Plaintiffs alleged that health care providers had been expressly ad-
vised by Mrs. Leach, when competent, that she did not wish to be kept
alive by machines. These wishes were echoed by all of her family mem-
bers. Further, the family members alleged that for two months, while
Mrs. Leach was on life support, the health care professionals had failed
to inform them of her true condition and had administered experimen-
tal drugs to her without consent. The court concluded that these allega-
tions raised questions of fact that could, at trial, support all of the claims
except the invasion of privacy claim. That claim failed as a matter of law
since the right to privacy was held to be a personal right which lapsed on
the death of Mrs. Leach. 53 On remand, prior to trial, the defendant hos-
pital settled for $50,000. The case against the doctor was dismissed
when the trial court found the evidence inadequate to submit the case to
the jury-a ruling which was not appealed.
2. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center
54
Seventy year-old Mr. Bartling had many serious illnesses, including
cancer. In April 1984, he was admitted to the defendant hospital. His
lung collapsed during a biopsy and he was placed on a ventilator. Be-
cause he kept trying to remove the ventilator tubes, his wrists were
placed in "soft restraints." The hospital admitted that Mr. Bartling was
competent. Despite his repeated demands, the hospital and his doctors
refused to disconnect the ventilator.
55
In June 1984, Mr. Bartling and his wife brought an action for in-
junctive relief to restrain the defendants from providing the unwanted
49. Id. at 395-98, 469 N.E.2d at 1051-53.
50. Id. at 395, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 398, 469 N.E.2d at 1054.
53. Id. Application of survival statutes have an unusual result in ight-to-die damage
actions. See infra pp. 59-63.
54. 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986).
55. Id. at 966, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
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treatment. 56 The suit also included several damage claims. The
Bartlings pled five tort theories: (1) battery; (2) violation of state and
federal constitutional rights; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (5) conspiracy. General and puni-
tive damages as well as attorney's fees were sought.
5 7
On the first appeal, the court in Bartling v. Superior Court 58 (Bartling
I) granted the order to discontinue the unwanted treatment. Bartling I
remanded the case to consider the issue of attorney's fees, which the
trial court denied. 59 On the second appeal, the court reversed and re-
manded a second time.60 On the second remand, the trial court sus-
tained a demurrer to the third amended complaint, denied leave to
amend and dismissed the damages case. The third appeal in Bartling v.
Glendale Adventist Medical Center (Bartling II) followed.
6 1
In reviewing the background to the damages case the Bartling H
court reiterated the holding in Bartling I that, on balance, Mr. Bartling's
right to discontinue unwanted treatment outweighed the interests of the
state in keeping him alive against his will. 6 2 That, however, did not
mean that defendants' refusal to terminate life support was tortious
under the circumstances. The court held that because the state of the
law was unclear at the time, and since the defendants' conduct was based
on what they believed in good faith was their duty to preserve life in
accordance with prevailing medical standards, no liability would
attach.
63
The court then went claim by claim through the pleadings and dis-
posed of each of plaintiff's theories. Mr. Bartling's claims for pain and
suffering were held not to survive his death. 64 Since defendants did not
violate plaintiffs' clearly established rights their actions could neither
have evinced a "conscious disregard" for plaintiffs' rights nor be consid-
ered extreme or outrageous. 65 The conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) was insufficient because there was no allegation of racial or
class based discriminatory animus, and the other common law conspir-
acy claims were not supported by sufficient factual allegations. 66 The
trial court's dismissal with prejudice was accordingly affirmed 6 7.
56. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
57. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 967, 229 Cal.
Rptr. at 362.
58. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
59. 184 Cal. App. 3d at 967, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
60. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d 97, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (1986).
61. 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986).
62. Id. at 969, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court in Bartling I restated and weighed the
commonly accepted governmental interests in such cases, first set out seven years earlier
in Superintendent of Bechertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (1977). 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
63. 184 Cal. App. 3d at 968-69, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
64. Id. at 969-70, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 364. See infra pp. 59-63 for a discussion of the
survival of claims in right-to-die cases.
65. Id. at 970, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
66. Id. at 972, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
67. Id. at 973, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
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3. The Bouvia Cases
In 1983, 25 year-old Elizabeth Bouvia sought a court order which
would allow her to starve to death in a California public hospital. She
was quadriplegic and suffered from severe cerebral palsy and crippling
arthritis. Her condition was not terminal, but she suffered constant
pain and experienced great difficulty eating. The trial court denied the
relief she requested. Subsequently, Ms. Bouvia abandoned her
appeal.
6 8
Two years later, with her condition deteriorating, she checked into
another public hospital which implanted a morphine dispensing pump
in her chest to help relieve her pain. Stabilized, she was transferred to
High Desert Hospital (HDH), a county medical facility. There her treat-
ing physician ordered the placement of a nasogastric feeding tube
against her will.
69
Ms. Bouvia responded by filing a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief
and damages. The trial court refused to grant a preliminary injunction.
Ms. Bouvia petitioned the state court of appeal for a writ of mandamus
and other extraordinary relief. In Bouvia v. Superior Court 70 (Bouvia I), a
precedent-setting and dramatic opinion, the court of appeals confirmed
her constitutionally based right to refuse forced tube feeding regardless
of the fact that she was not terminal.
7'
The tube was removed pursuant to the court of appeal decision, but
Ms. Bouvia's doctor then informed her that the morphine pump was not
medically indicated and would be removed after she was "detoxified."
Ms. Bouvia once again responded with a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief
and more damages in Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles72 (Bouvia II).
To date, the two underlying damage actions have still not been
tried. The complaints in both of Ms. Bouvia's actions state identical
claims for relief even though the facts are different. Three substantive
claims are made: (1) battery; (2) violation of constitutional and civil
rights (privacy and due process liberty interests); and (3) intentional in-
68. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
300 (1986).
69. See Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1987).
70. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
71. Id. at 1138-39, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302. The holding in Bouvia I was an expansion of
the doctrine announced in Barting v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220 (1984), in that the court emphasized for the first time the unconditional right of a
competent adult to decide his or her own fate regardless of what the motives were behind
the decision. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
72. 195 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1987). The trial court granted plain-
tiff's request for a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo. Court ap-
pointed experts suggested, and the court ordered, that Ms. Bouvia be transferred to a
different facility where she might be weaned from her dependence on morphine. Id. at
1080-81, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42.
Believing Ms. Bouvia had been successful in Bouvia I, which resulted in the writ order-
ing removal of the feeding tube, and in Bouvia II, which resulted in the temporary re-
straining order, plaintiff's counsel filed for attorney's fees, thus resulting in the
consolidated fees opinion in Bouvia I. Id.
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fliction of emotional distress. Additionally, each complaint states a claim
for conspiracy to commit the alleged torts and seeks injunctive relief,
punitive and compensatory damages, attorney' s fees and CoStS.
7 3
4. McVey v. Englewood Hospital Association 
74
The adult children of Elizabeth Palermo, a stroke victim received by
the hospital in a deep coma, sued the hospital, its administrator and
treating doctors for maintaining their mother on a respirator against the
family's and Ms. Palermo's previously expressed wishes.7 5 The defend-
ants took the position that Ms. Palermo had been properly attached to
the respirator upon admission and could not thereafter be disconnected
because, even though her condition was "without hope", she was not
completely brain dead. Further, the defendants refused to have the mat-
ter reviewed by the hospital ethics committee. Plaintiffs were forced to
go to court, and approximately one month later received an order ap-
pointing them guardians of Ms. Palermo with the power to make medi-
cal treatment decisions. Plaintiffs ordered the respirator removed. That
was done, and four days later Ms. Palermo died. This damage action
followed.
76
Plaintiffs' amended complaint contained sixteen claims. Plaintiffs
sued for themselves individually and for Ms. Palermo's estate. The
claims asserted were based upon theories of (1) negligence; (2) negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress; (3) breach of fiduciary duties,
(4) breach of physician-patient relationship; (5) assault and battery;
73., In Bouvia H the court of appeals granted attorney's fees for the writ obtained in
Bouvia I, citing the state private attorney general law, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1021.5 (West
1976), which allows for an award of fees if an action vindicates an important right or con-
fers a significant benefit on the general public. However, the court denied fees in both
cases under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982),
which allows for an award of reasonable fees to the prevailing plaintiff in a federal civil
rights action. 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1086, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
In a poorly worded opinion the court threw together a variety of reasons why § 1988
was not applicable as the record then stood: plaintiff's injuries were not proximately
caused by the execution of a government policy or custom, the doctors were not guided by
any such policy or customs, and no showing was made that defendants proximately caused
Ms. Bouvia to suffer a violation of civil rights. Then, before concluding that the case was
"simply not the type of situation which that act was designed to encompass," the court put
into doubt the constitutional analysis of its two earlier precedent-setting cases with this
paragraph:
While it is true that in both Bartling I and Bouvia II the author of the majority
opinion alluded to a constitutional basis for the right vindicated, it seems clear
that the right primarily is a development of the common law, and for that reason
applies to patients in private as well as governmental facilities and to patients
being treated by private as well as publicly-employed medical practitioners.
Id. at 1088, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 248. (citation omitted).
74. 216 N.J. Super. 502, 524 A.2d 450 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 108 NJ. 182, 528 A.2d
12 (1987).
75. Ms. Palermo, age 91, suffered a severe stroke at her home and was discovered
approximately three hours later. She was transported to the hospital and immediately at-
tached to a respirator. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Palermo's daughter arrived and immediately
instructed one of the doctors that neither Ms. Palermo nor any family member wanted a
respirator to be used. First Amended Complaint at 10-13, McVey v. Englewood Hosp.
Ass'n, No. L-090901-85 (Bergen County, N.J. Ct. filed Jan. 28, 1986).
76. 216 N.J. Super. at 505, 542 A.2d at 452.
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(6) conspiracy to violate and violation of constitutional and common law
rights to privacy, liberty, freedom from unlawful seizure and bodily self-
determination; and (7) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under
law) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights) .
Plaintiffs sought punitive and compensatory damages for pain and suf-
fering, including reimbursement of over $21,000 in medical expenses
and over $5,500 in legal expenses incurred in the guardianship proceed-
ings. 7 7 The amended complaint was dismissed and the plaintiffs
appealed.
In a very brief opinion, the appellate court upheld the dismissal. It
noted the responsibility of the medical profession to preserve life, espe-
cially in an emergency situation. Most importantly, the court rejected
the theory that the health care providers had some duty of their own to
"determine the existence, veracity and effect of an incompetent's orally
expressed treatment decision," 7 8 and found that the guardianship pro-
ceeding was an appropriate-though not always required-way for such
decisions to be effected.
79
5. Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospital8 0
This case involved Hector Rodas, a 34 year-old Guatemalan, who
suffered a drug-induced stroke on February 10, 1986. The stroke left
him in a "locked-in" state in which his mind was essentially intact but his
body was virtually paralyzed. He could not speak or swallow, so a feed-
ing tube had been inserted into his stomach. He could respond reliably
to "yes or no" questions by nodding his head. This limited movement
also allowed him to spell out messages with the help of a therapist point-
ing to a letter board. Mr. Rodas was not terminal but had a severely
reduced life expectancy, and there was no real hope for significant
improvement.
8 1
On June 17, 1986, Mr. Rodas spelled out a message demanding that
he not be fed and hydrated through the gastrostomy tube. The defend-
ant hospital and doctor refused to comply but immediately informed Mr.
Rodas' lawyer. On August 22, 1986, the hospital and doctors filed a peti-
tion in state probate court requesting appointment of a guardian and a
declaration as to whether Mr. Rodas had the right to refuse nutrition
and hydration at the defendant hospital.
8 2
After a thirteen-day trial, which Mr. Rodas attended daily, the state
77. While these numerous theories were asserted, the essence of the claims sounded
in malpractice or negligence. See Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Society For The
Right To Die at 11-13, McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.J. Super. 182, 524 A.2d
452 (App. Div. 1987).
78. 216 N.J. Super. at 506, 524 A.2d at 452.
79. Id. See Annotation, Judicial Power to Order Discontinuance of Life-Sustaining Treatment,
48 A.L.R. 4th 67 (1986).
80. 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987).
81. Id. at 1530.
82. Id.
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probate court issued a far-reaching order.8 3 Among other things, the
court held that, utilizing any of the suggested tests, Mr. Rodas had the
mental capacity to decide his own treatment. Further, the court held that
Mr. Rodas had a constitutionally-protected right of privacy to refuse
medical treatment and that gastrostomy tube feeding and hydration con-
stituted such treatment. Finally, the court held that because of the cir-
cumstances of the case Mr. Rodas would be permitted to remain at
Hilltop and receive general nursing care while dying through refusal of
nutrition and hydration. Defendants did not appeal the order and on
February 6, 1987, Mr. Rodas died at Hilltop.
8 4
Just prior to his death, Mr. Rodas filed a damage action in federal
court against the hospital, its administration, its staff and his doctors.
The suit stated numerous claims, including negligence, breach of con-
tract, breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligent and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 198385 and a private cause of action under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.86 Shortly after his death Mr. Rodas' attorneys amended the
complaint and abandoned all state tort claims, having concluded that
damages for pain and suffering under such claims were personal to Mr.
Rodas and did not survive his death.
8 7
On cross motions for summary judgment on the remaining federal
claims, the district court entered a decision for defendants. The court
held that Hilltop and the defendant doctor were private, not govern-
mental actors whose conduct was not fairly attributable to the state.
Since state action is a required element under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that
claim was dismissed.
8 8
The district court also ruled against Mr. Rodas' Rehabilitation Act
(the "Act") claim. Mr. Rodas alleged that defendants had discriminated
against him in violation of the Act in two ways. First, Mr. Rodas alleged
the defendants discriminated against him by incorrectly treating him as
mentally handicapped, and therefore unable to decide to forego treat-
ment. Second, Mr. Rodas alleged the defendants discriminated against
him because of his actual physical handicap by failing to obtain court
authorization for treatment-treatment he did not want but physically
83. In re Hector 0. Rodas, No. 86-P-139, slip. op. (Dist. Ct. of Colo., Grand County,
April 3, 1987, superseding order of January 22, 1987).
84. 676 F. Supp. at 1531-32.
85. To establish a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must establish the following ele-
ments: (1) an entity acting under color of state law, (2) who subjects or causes any person
to be subjected, (3) to a deprivation of rights secured under the Constitution or law of the
United States. Id. at 1535.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
87. First Amended Complaint, Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., No. 87-F-187 (D.
Colo. filed July 29, 1987).
88. 676 F. Supp. at 1535-37. The judge in Ross relied heavily on a finding in Bouvia I
that there had been no state involvement. 676 F. Supp. at 1537. The earliest case to ad-
dress the issue in the context of a federal civil rights damage claim was a precursor to the
Leach case, in which an Ohio federal district court judge dismissed plaintiffs' damage claim
with a finding of no state action. Leach v. Shapiro, No. C81-2559A (N.D. Ohio June 25,
1982). See Oddi, supra note 16, at 648 n.101.
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was unable to refuse. The court held that the Act does not reach medical
treatment decisions of or for handicapped individuals, and that in any
event there was no evidence that defendants' treatment of Mr. Rodas
was "discriminatory" as defined under the Act.89
6. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital 90
On April 25, 1980, 20 year-old Jeffrey Strachan shot himself in the
head with a .38 caliber handgun. Comatose but still breathing on his
own, he was transported to the defendant hospital. Soon after admission
he stopped breathing.
9 '
Though clinically brain dead, he was placed on a respirator. That
afternoon one of the treating physicians asked the parents if they would
consider donating Jeffrey's organs for transplant. The parents consid-
ered the matter and the next morning informed the attending physician
that they were not going to authorize donation. They asked that the res-
pirator be turned off. The doctor advised them to give the matter more
thought. That evening the parents repeated their request that the respi-
rator be turned off. The attending physician noted in the chart that he
would do so as soon as the hospital instructed him as to the proper pro-
cedure. The hospital administrator was contacted.
9 2
Never before having been faced with such a situation, the adminis-
trator called the hospital's attorney. During confused communications
the parents were first informed that the respirator could not be turned
off without a court order. Later, the hospital took the position that treat-
ment could be discontinued without judicial involvement if two electro-
encephalagrams (EEGs) were run 24 hours apart and showed irrevers-
ible brain death. After another day's delay the EEGs were performed
and brain death was confirmed. The next day the parents were told that
if they executed a release requesting cessation of treatment the respira-
tor would be disconnected. They did so. The respirator was stopped and
their son was declared dead, four days after arriving at the hospital.
93
The parents brought suit alleging negligent infliction of emotional
distress and wrongful withholding of a dead body. At trial, the jury
awarded the parents $70,000 for each of the claims. The intermediate
appellate court reversed. Over a lengthy and passionate dissent, the ma-
jority held that there had been no dead body to wrongfully withhold
since no physician had actually declared death priorto the life support
system being turned off.
94
89. 676 F. Supp. at 1538-39. The district court also rejected plaintiff's assertion that
the earlier state probate proceedings had not provided a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate the claims under the Act, and further ruled that the Rehabilitation Act claim was
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. 676 F. Supp. at 1538-42.
90. 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988).
91. Id. at 526, 538 A.2d at 347.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 527-28, 538 A.2d at 348.
94. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, 209 NJ. Super. 300, 314, 507
A.2d 718, 725 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 NJ. 523, 538 A.2d 346
(1988).
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Next, the court turned to the novel question of whether defendants
could be liable for failing to have procedures in place for disconnecting
life support systems. The jury had found that the defendant hospital and
its administrator were negligent in failing to have such procedures in
place. The appellate court held that no such duty existed. No legitimate
public policy considerations suggested to the court that non-doctors be
required to establish termination procedures. Accordingly, failure to
have such procedures was not negligence. 9 5
On final appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. It held that there was but one duty owed to the parents:
to act reasonably in the disposition of their son's body. 96 Finding that
there was more than enough evidence to support a jury conclusion that
Jeffrey was dead soon after arriving at the hospital, the court reinstated
the wrongful withholding claim and ordered a new trial on the issue of
damages. 97 The court agreed with the appellate division and held, as a
matter of law, that no duty existed which required the hospital to adopt
life-support termination procedures. Such matters, the court ruled,
were the business of the medical community and not the judiciary. Fail-
ure to have such procedures might relate to whether the body had been
wrongfully withheld, but did not create the basis for an additional and
separate negligence claim. 98
7. Westheart v. Anaheim Memorial Hospital99
Plaintiff in this case was the spouse of 76 year-old George Wes-
theart, who entered the defendant hospital in a vegetative-like state on
February 21, 1985. On admittance, Westheart was suffering from con-
gestive heart failure, pneumonia, chronic organic brain syndrome secon-
dary to previous multiple strokes and dehydration. 10 0 Against Mrs.
Westheart's order that no extraordinary or heroic measures be taken to
sustain her husband's life, the defendants inserted a gastrostomy feed-
ing tube. The complaint further alleged that the operation was per-
formed for the purpose of inflating medical expenses, and while it would
extend Mr. Westheart's life, would provide him no net benefits since it
would not improve his prognosis.10 1 In fact, Mr. Westheart died prior
to the filing of the complaint. 10
2
Mrs. Westheart brought suit in her individual capacity as surviving
95. 209 N.J. Super. at 318, 507 A.2d at 727. The court was extremely concerned
about creating new bases for hospital liability while the country was in the "midst of a
medical malpractice crisis," and where no previous cases had established such a duty. Id.
96. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d at 349
(1988).
97. Id. at 538, 538 A.2d at 354.
98. Id. at 538, 538 A.2d at 349.
99. No. 493416 (Super. Ct., County of Orange, Cal. filed Jime 26, 1986) (dismissed
with prejudice on defendant's demurrer), appealfiled, No. G 005933 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
100. Complaint at 9, Westheart v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp., No. 493416 (Super.
Ct., County of Orange, Cal. filed June 26, 1986) (dismissed with prejudice on defendant's
demurrer), appealfled, No. G 005933 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
101. Id. at 10-11.
102. Id. at 7.
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spouse. The complaint alleged a claim for negligent and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. Mrs. Westheart sought compensatory and
punitive damages. ' 0 3 The case was dismissed by the trial court for fail-
ure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. It is currently
pending in the California Court of Appeals.1
0 4
8. Galvin v. University Hospital of Cleveland 1
0 5
OnJune 30, 1985, Mr. Galvin, who was suffering from serious heart
problems, checked in to the defendant hospital. As his condition wors-
ened he instructed his doctor that he wished to be allowed to die in
peace and wanted no heroic efforts to be employed to resuscitate him. In
spite of these directions, Mr. Galvin was subjected to cardioversion, a
procedure whereby an electric shock is applied to the exterior chest wall,
when he experienced a dangerously erratic heartbeat. Upon being stabi-
lized, Mr. Galvin checked himself out of the hospital against medical ad-
vice. He died at home a short time later. This case was then filed by his
wife and two adult children.'
0 6
The case set out one claim on behalf of the estate and one claim on
behalf of the surviving family members. The estate's claim sought dam-
ages for Mr. Galvin's pain and suffering, emotional distress and unnec-
essary medical expenses, while generally alleging battery and informed
consent violations. '
0 7
The family's claim was based on theories of negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The case proceeded to ajury trial
in April, 1988, where a verdict was returned on behalf of the defendant
health care providers.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES AND CLAIMS
A. Differing State Approaches
Plaintiffs have been conspicuously unsuccessful in prevailing on
damage actions growing out of right-to-die cases. While unreported ap-
pellate or trial court successes may possibly exist, the only known award
received by a plaintiff occurred as a result of the ruling in the Leach
case.' 0 8 That case merely reinstated a claim dismissed before trial by
the lower court judge. The award was through settlement with the hos-
pital and does not reflect a judicial imposition of liability. In fact, when
the non-settling doctor in that case went to trial, the judge directed a
verdict on his behalf without allowing the case to go to the jury. 10 9
103. Id. at 13.
104. Westheart v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp., No. 493416 (Super. Ct., County of Or-
ange, Cal. filed June 26, 1986) (dismissed with prejudice on defendant's demurrer), appeal
filed, No. G 005933 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
105. No. 115873 (Ohio Ct. of Com. Pleas, Cuyahoga County, filed Sept. 8, 1986).
106. Complaint, Galvin v. University Hospital of Cleveland, No. 115873 (Ohio Ct. of
Com. Pleas, Cuyahoga County, filed Sept. 8, 1986).
107. d. at 16-19.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
109. Id.
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The Strachan I 10 and Galvin I cases are the only cases which have
proceeded all the way through trial. Strachan is a somewhat unusual case
even for the right-to-die area, in that the liability theory approved by the
New Jersey Supreme Court involved the mishandling of the dead body
of the plaintiffs' son. Presumably, plaintiffs' claim would have been just
as valid if defendants had merely refused to release the boy's body for
the four days.' 12 In this light, the health care providers' application of
the futile life-support can be seen as merely aggravating circumstances
surrounding the quasi-property right infringement." l3 Nevertheless,
Strachan did not approve a damage theory common to the more "tradi-
tional" right-to-die cases: where the complaint centers around the inter-
ference with the right to refuse treatment. While Galvin did involve such
a claim, no appellate decision resulted from the case.
Therefore, while plaintiffs have been successful in a limited number
of cases when they have been able to get to a jury, they have been much
less successful in front ofjudges. I14 That is not to minimize the impor-
tance of Leach. By holding that a health care provider's conduct in a
right-to-die case can support a civil damage action, Leach laid the foun-
dation for a case like Galvin. Nevertheless, the eight cases reviewed here
do not provide immediate encouragement for those urging the recogni-
tion of a damage claim in right-to-die cases. Furthermore, five of these
cases were handed down from appellate jurisdictions that are leaders in
championing patients' rights to refuse treatment.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, which denied certiorari in McVey
1 15
and which affirmed the intermediate appellate court reversal of the more
"traditional" claim in Strachan, issued the country's first modern right-
to-die opinion in Quinlan.' 16 Quinlan was a broadly-worded decision con-
firming a fundamental constitutional right to reject treatment. It applied
that right in a situation involving a family member's decision on behalf
of an incompetent patient. Since Quinlan, the New Jersey appellate
courts have continued to be at the forefront in expanding right-to-die
jurisprudence. 117
In the 1985 case of In re Conroy, l l8 the New Jersey Supreme Court
110. See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
112. See Annotation, Liability in Damages for Withholding Corpse From Relatives, 48 A.L.R.
3d 240 (1973).
113. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS ch.2 § 12 (5th ed. 1984) (prop-
erty right in dead bodies evolved "out of thin air" to protect feelings of survivors "under a
fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer"). Id. at 63.
114. The appellate decision in Leach is certainly significant. In reinstating plaintiff's
claims, the Ohio appellate court acknowledged that health care providers may subject
themselves to civil liability for not only compensatory but also punitive damages if they
provide unwanted treatment. The appellate court approved theories of informed consent,
violation of constitutional rights and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See supra
text accompanying notes 45-50.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
116. See supra text accompanying note 15.
117. New Jersey has more reported and precedent-setting right to die cases than any
other jurisdiction. See SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 3, at NJ-I to NJ-20.
118. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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issued one of the most far-reaching right-to-die decisions of the time.
After approving the use of living wills and holding that nasogastric tube
feeding was medical treatment which could be refused, the court set out
three alternative tests for allowing such decisions to be made for incom-
petent patients. 1l 9 In 1986, In re Requena 120 was one of the first cases
ordering an unwilling hospital to care for a patient who had refused tube
feeding. Then, in 1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued three ma-
jor right-to-die decisions on the same day.
In re Farrell 121 clarified and applied the rule that a competent termi-
nal individual has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The court
was faced with a 37 year-old mother of two, completely disabled with
ALS, who was being cared for at home and who was attached to a respi-
rator. In setting out a procedure whereby treatment could be refused,
the court stressed that primarily the patient, along with family and doc-
tors-not the courts-should be making treatment decisions. 12 2 In re Pe-
ter 123 involved a guardian's request to remove a feeding tube from a 60
year-old nursing home resident who was being maintained in a vegeta-
tive state. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that life-sustaining treat-
ment can be withdrawn when there is clear and convincing evidence of
the patient's wishes, regardless of the length of life expectancy.' 24 The
court concluded by urging legislative action in the area. 12 5 In reJobes 126
held that if certain evidentiary standards were met a young vegetative
nursing home patient could reject life-sustaining treatment by having
close family members exercise substituted judgment on her behalf, even
though the patient herself never spoke directly about the issue when
competent.
These decisions put New Jersey at the forefront of right-to-die law.
It therefore may be significant that in McVey and Strachan the New Jersey
appellate courts were so inhospitable to plaintiffs' right-to-die damage
claims.' 2 7 While the Strachan court seemed willing to fit the facts into
more traditionally recognized tort theories and subject health care prov-
119. Id.
120. 213 N.J. Super. 475, 517 A.2d 886 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 213 NJ. Super. 443, 517 A.2d
869 (App. Div. 1986) (per curiam).
121. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
122. Id. at 341-43, 529 A.2d at 413-15.
123. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
124. In re Peter is the first decision which interpreted a general health-care proxy to
reach decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment, even when the state's durable power
of attorney statute did not authorize medical proxy decisions. Id. at 370, 529 A.2d at 426,
429.
125. At the time, New Jersey was not one of the 39 jurisdictions with living will legisla-
tion. See supra note 7.
126. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
127. The McVey court ended its opinion by commenting on whether doctors had a duty
to obey family requests to remove life-sustaining treatment: "[tihat time has not come in
New Jersey." McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 216 N.J. Super. 502, 506, 524 A.2d 450,
452. In Strachan, while the court ruled in plaintiffs' favor on the claim that defendants had
wrongfully withheld a dead body, the court held that under existing law the hospital owed
no duty to plaintiffs to have procedures or forms for use in terminating life-sustaining
treatment. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., No. A-77, slip op. at 8-9. (NJ.
Mar. 16, 1988).
19881
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
iders to liability, the court refused to recognize a duty which could serve
as the basis for expanded litigation in the future. Of course, the underly-
ing events in Strachan occurred in 1980, when the only reported New
Jersey court decision was Quinlan, and the law was much less clear than it
is today. The underlying action in McVey occurred in April, 1985, only
three months after New Jersey's second right-to-die case had been
decided. 1
28
California, another state which has had multiple right-to-die dam-
age claims, is another of the jurisdictions with advanced law in the un-
derlying area. Barber v. Superior Court,12 9 decided in 1983, was the first
case to clear doctors of criminal charges where they had acted to with-
draw life-sustaining treatment from an elderly vegetative patient. The
decision represented a milestone in approving the discontinuance of ar-
tificial nourishment and sanctioning the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment without a court order. '3 0 Bartling v. Superior Court 131 (Bartling
I) extended Barber and held that the right to reject life-sustaining treat-
ment was not limited to terminal or comatose patients. While the dam-
age claim later brought in this case was unsuccessful, 13 2 substantial
attorney's fees were later ordered to be paid by the doctors and hospital
for fees incurred in obtaining the injunctive relief order in the right to
refuse treatment part of the case. 13 3 Bouvia v. Superior Court 134 (Bouvia
I) confirmed the state and federal constitutional and common law right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In upholding Ms. Bouvia's right to
refuse treatment the court found that her motive was immaterial, and
that the hospital-a public institution-would be compelled to provide
her general care during the effectuation of her decision.'
3 5
The unsuccessful Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (Bartling
II) damage claim was decided by the California appellate courts after
the decisions affirming the right to reject life-sustaining treatment in
Barber and Bouvia I. However, the action complained of in Bartling II oc-
curred prior to the publication of the decision in Bouvia I. Therefore, at
the time the Bartling II doctors were acting, the only announced decision
in the area was Barber, and that case dealt with criminal charges against
doctors who withdrew treatment from a vegetative patient who was
much more disabled than Mr. Bartling. In that context, the appellate
court's statement in Bartling II that Bartling's survivors' rights were "not
legally established or clearly developed in California before [Bartling
128. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
129. 147 Cal. App.3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
130. Id. at 1018-1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-94.
131. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 56-69.
133. In October 1987, Bartling's attorneys were awarded $160,008 for work performed
in Barting I. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, No. C 500735 slip op. (Cal.
Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, Oct. 14, 1987). While plaintiffs have not been very suc-
cessful on their substantive damage claims, an award of attorneys fees against a health care
provider can result in the functional equivalent of such a damage award and serve as a
powerful warning to other health care providers.
134. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
135. Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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I],,136 while neglecting to mention Barber, is generally accurate. How-
ever, the actions forming the grounds for the pending damage claims in
Bouvia II and Westheart occurred after both Barber and Bartling I had been
decided. Whether that fact will affect the outcome of Bouvia II is an open
question.
The approach taken by the Ohio courts has been the most "pro-
gressive." With absolutely no state precedents in the right-to-die area,
an intermediate state court of appeals in Estate of Leach v. Shapiro held
that claims for relief existed for wrongfully placing a patient on life sup-
port. 13 7 In sustaining the viability of these claims the court cited to
Ohio cases outside of the right-to-die area.
In generally sustaining the battery claim in Leach, the court cited to
an Ohio case which held that a battery was committed when a plastic
surgeon performed rhinoplasty on a minor without proper consent.'
3 8
In further analyzing the battery claim under the informed consent the-
ory, the court cited to an Ohio X-ray malpractice case where it was held
that a battery claim was stated if a patient's consent to a touching was
given without sufficient explanation of the possible effects of the
procedure. '
3 9
Throughout the entire Leach opinion only two references to other
right-to-die cases were made. In holding that under Ohio law the only
way life-support systems could properly be disconnected was pursuant
to a court order, the court noted that such a holding was in accord with
other jurisdictions which had considered the matter.14 0 The only other
citation in Leach to right-to-die cases was made in generally discussing
informed consent doctrine.
4 1
The Colorado damages action grew out of treatment in the state's
first right-to-die decision. The plaintiff decided to proceed solely on her
two federal claims, having abandoned numerous state causes of action.
136. 184 Cal. App.3d at 970, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
137. 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes
47-54.
138. 13 Ohio App.3d at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1051 (citing Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St.
12, 16, 139 N.E.2d 25, 31 (1956)).
139. 13 Ohio App. 3d at 398, 469 N.E.2d at 1052 (citing Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio
App. 2d 113, 114, 234 N.E.2d 311, 312 (1967)).
140. 13 Ohio App. 3d at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1052-53 (citing Superintendent of
Beichertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re
Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.2d 517 (1980), modified, In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)). In fact, the Leach court was
incorrect in that regard. Just six months after Saikewicz, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
decided In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978), which substantially
cut back the requirement for a court order as set out in Saikewicz. Dinnerstein was confirmed
two years later in the case of In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). Both
cases were decided and reported several years before the decision in Leach. New York, on
the other, hand, continues to be the only jurisdiction which still regularly approves of the
parties obtaining such court orders. See In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511,
515 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
141. The court noted that if one carried informed consent doctrine to its extreme and
waited to act until a patient was completely disabled the privacy rights recognized in other
right to die cases could be circumvented. Leach, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 398, 469 N.E.2d at
1053.
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Accordingly, the trial court did not have occasion to analyze the state
tort claims. The case, therefore, says little about how Colorado courts
might view such damage actions in the future.
142
There is a distinct difference in the way the various courts have ad-
dressed these damage claims. The Leach court took the approach that
such a claim was already well-founded in existing state tort law. By ex-
tending these common law tort principles, the court was willing to allow
the jury to decide whether defendants had violated the rights of the pa-
tient or the family. California and New Jersey have taken a very different
approach. They have extended great deference to the medical profes-
sion-almost to the point of allowing the health care providers to define
what course of conduct is reasonable in these cases. The difference be-
tween these two approaches comes down to the question of what duty a
particular court is willing to impose on health care providers.
B. The Duty a Health care Provider Owes Patients and Families
The right-to-die damage actions which have gone to court have re-
lied on numerous theories. Some cases, like Westheart have pled a single
claim (infliction of emotional distress on a surviving spouse). Others,
like McVey, pled well over a dozen claims, split between the decedent's
estate and the surviving family members. Given the lack of substantive
success, and the great variety of fact situations involved, no key to what a
properly pled complaint should look like can be offered.1
4 3
While commentators have examined some of the cases and sug-
gested numerous damage claim theories, plaintiffs' lawyers have been
even more creative in just the few cases reviewed here. 144 It certainly
has not been for lack of trying that successful theories have not yet been
crafted. Rather, with the exception of Ohio courts, the courts which have
considered these damage claims seem reluctant to extend tort law prin-
ciples which have been established in other medical practice cases into
the right-to-die area. While their decisions acknowledge the existence of
these principles, so far the courts have failed to apply them. This has
been either because the right of the plaintiff to refuse the treatment was
not clearly established, or because the court failed to find that the health
142. Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospital, 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D.Colo. 1987). The
remaining federal claims presented a novel question of the applicability of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which the court rejected. The court also addressed the ex-
tremely important issue of state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, discussed at length below.
See infra text accompanying notes 82-92.
143. Charting the claims in the various damage cases clearly demonstrates which
causes of action were most frequently pled. Only Westheart and Bouvia did not include a
survival action made on behalf of the decedent's estate (Ms. Bouvia is still alive). All other
cases included claims on behalf of surviving family members, except Ross, in which the sole
plaintiff was the decedent's estate.
144. Comment, Damage Actions For Nonconsensual Life-Sustaining Treatment, 30 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 895, 911 (1986), mentions ten damage theories, all but one of which have been
raised in the cases reviewed here ("false imprisonment"). Additionally, plaintiffs' raised
unsuccessful claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985 in McVey and § 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 in Ross.
[Vol. 65:2-3
RIGHT-TO-DIE DAMAGE ACTIONS
care provider owed any duty to be governed by those principles.14 5
Recognition of patients' rights and general health care provider du-
ties in this area should expand as case law continues to clarify the rela-
tionship between the parties. This, however, may take a significant
amount of time, depending on how the courts approach the issues. Even
New Jersey, which has many of the most "advanced" right-to-die cases,
has chosen to announce fairly fact-specific decisions, instead of enunci-
ating general rules of sweeping scope. 146 New Jersey also has the most
reported right-to-die decisions, and has been deciding these cases since
1976, with its ground-breaking decision in Quinlan. The majority of
other states still have no reported right-to-die decisions.
As demonstrated by the California and New Jersey opinions in
Bartling H and McVey, there may be a reluctance to recognize damage
claims against health care providers who ignore treatment refusal deci-
sions for some years. This reluctance may remain even after the state's
initial right-to-die case precedents are established, and may remain all
the more true for cases involving claims in which the alleged tortious
behavior occurred closer to the date of the state's first such decision.
Therefore, if other states adopt the California and New Jersey approach
of viewing these right-to-die damage actions as sui generis, it may well be
many years before such claims can be expected to survive defendants'
summary judgment motions.
On the other hand, if states to adopt the Ohio approach and apply
the already clearly established law of medical battery and informed con-
sent principles, claims will quickly pass the summary judgment hurdle
and reach the juries. Under this model, health care providers will still be
able to argue the difficult facts of the case in their affirmative defenses.
Viewing the cases this way, the Ohio model acknowledges the general
health care provider duty not to treat without consent and leaves it to
the trial process to determine whether the duty was breached. The Cali-
fornia and New Jersey model allows the judge to determine, under the
specific facts of the case, whether any duty even existed.
The Ohio model obviously exposes the health care provider to
more potential risk. The California and New Jersey model is oriented to,
and protects the rights of, the health care provider. The Ohio model is
oriented to, and protects the rights of, patient autonomy. A legitimate
policy question exists regarding who, the judge or the jury, should de-
cide whether the duty not to treat without consent should be applied
under the circumstances of a given right-to-die damage action.
The question of whether a duty exists in a given situation is a matter
of law to be decided by the court. 14 7 However, much depends on how
145. See supra notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (1985) (only
applies to elderly nursing home patients who are expected to die within a year). Even the
narrow holding in Conroy was later refined. See In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419
(1987).
147. See Strachan v.John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, 209 N.J. Super. 300, 507 A.2d
718 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that there was no legal duty for the hospital to have a proce-
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the issue is framed. The Ohio court accepted the premise that health
care providers generally have a duty not to treat without consent, and
that duty is absolute, until competing interests are weighed in court.14
8
This approach, by the way it defines the duty involved, will allow such
claims to go to trial, and require the health care provider to assert af-
firmative defenses based on the facts.'
4 9
The California and New Jersey approach, by taking a much more
narrow view of the duty issue, allows the court to reject the existence of
a duty as a matter of law. For example, in McVey the court posed the
duty question as whether the failure to comply with the undocumented
request of a family member to immediately stop an incompetent's life-
sustaining treatment "constitutes an actionable breach of duty owed to
the patient and family."' 150 The court, having substantially narrowed
the duty issue by phrasing the question in such a way, found that no duty
legally existed. 151
If states adopt the Ohio approach then right-to-die damage law will
more quickly develop. If states adopt the California and New Jersey ap-
proach then the law will develop more slowly.
C. Additional Problems Facing Plaintiffs
Even if the Ohio approach is generally adopted, serious problems
still exist for plaintiffs. The first problem centers around the question of
the constitutional basis for the right to refuse treatment. The second
problem concerns the issue of the survivability of certain tort claims.
1. Is there really a constitutional right to refuse treatment?
Virtually every case that has discussed the right to refuse treatment
has found that such a right exists by virtue of the United States Constitu-
tion. The Quinlan case started it all. There, the court analyzed the fa-
ther's claim that Ms. Quinlan had a constitutional right to refuse
treatment. 152 After considering and rejecting the first and the eighth
dure in place to turn off life-support) (citing W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 356 (5th ed. 1984); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1015 (1956); RESTATE-
MENT'(SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965)).
148. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App.3d 393, 396, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52.
The court framed the legal interests in terms of the patient's absolute right to refuse
treatment. Where such a right exists, it creates a correlative duty on the part of the health-
care provider not to infringe that right. See Oddi, supra note 16, at 636.
149. Such affirmative defenses might include, for example, that the health care pro-
vider reasonably believed the patient making the demand was incompetent at the time, or
that the request was being made on behalf on an admittedly incompetent patient by some
family members while other family members disagreed. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehabili-
tation Hospital, 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1533-34 (D. Colo. 1987).
150. 216 NJ. Super. at 218, 524 A.2d at 452.
151. Id.
152. Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 355, A.2d at 660. Karen Ann Quinlan was 21 years old when
she lost oxygen flow to her brain for two fifteen-minute periods on April 15, 1975. She
was hospitalized in a persistent vegetative state with no cognitive function. She was placed
on a respirator and fed through a nasogastric tube. The parties stipulated that she was
incompetent. Her father sought both to be appointed her guardian and to be given an
order allowing him to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. These requests were opposed
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amendments as grounds for such a right, the court considered whether
the right of privacy protected the choice to refuse treatment. The court
traced the development of the constitutional right of privacy from Gris-
wold v. Connecticut 153 through Roe v. Wade, 154 and concluded that it was
broad enough to encompass a decision to refuse treatment. 15 5 After rul-
ing that no criminal liability would result to anyone if life-sustaining
treatment were discontinued, the court granted the father's petition.1
56
In right-to-die cases following Quinlan, the courts relied on this con-
stitutional right to privacy as the basis for the power to refuse treatment.
The next several cases decided in the area all picked up on Quinlan's
constitutional privacy right language. In Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz 157 and In re Dinnerstein,15 8 the Massachusetts appellate
courts decided the next two right-to-die cases, Both opinions upholding
the right to refuse treatment were based on the same right to privacy. 159
While Saikewicz involved the petition of a state facility, the court in Din-
nerstein failed to mention whether any governmental entities were
involved.
The year 1980 saw three right-to-die opinions issued in three differ-
ent states. Massachusetts decided In re Spring,160 Florida decided Satz v.
Perlmutter,16 1 and Delaware decided In re Sever.ns.1 6 2 In re Spring involved
an incompetent 79 year-old hemodialysis patient whose wife and son
petitioned for an order appointing a guardian and approving termina-
tion of life-support treatment. 163 The court granted the order, holding
that the constitutional right of privacy "to prevent unwanted infringe-
ment of bodily integrity," outweighed the state's interest in preserving
life.164 Likewise, in Satz, the Florida court of appeals held that a compe-
tent 73 year-old totally disabled ALS patient had the constitutional (pri-
vacy) right to refuse respirator treatment. The decision relied heavily on
the Saikewicz opinion. 16 5 Finally, in Severns, the Delaware Chancery
by Ms. Quinlan's doctors, the hospital, the County Prosecutor, the State of New Jersey and
the guardian ad litem.
153. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 663. The court also found that such a privacy
right existed under the state constitution. Id.
156. Id. at 52-53, 355 A.2d at 670-71.
157. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
158. 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
159. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738, 370 N.E. 2d at 424 (also relying on the common law
interest in preserving the inviolability of the person). Dinnerstein did not explicitly discuss
the constitutional issue but upheld the right to refuse treatment based on Saikewicz. 6
Mass. App. at 468-70, 380 A.2d at 136-38 (concluding that judicial proceedings not nor-
mally required).
160. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
161. 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afftd, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
162. 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980).
163. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
164. 380 Mass. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 119-20. The opinion includes no discussion of
whether any governmental entities or parties were involved. The court also relied on the
common law right to be "free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity." Id.
165. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 S.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 S.2d
359 (Fla. 1980) (adopting appellate court decision).
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Court adopted a previous appellate court decision in the same case, 166
and held that the husband of a 55 year-old comatose private nursing
home patient could exercise his wife's constitutional right to privacy and
refuse life-sustaining treatment.
16 7
While most of the early cases relied on the common law right of
bodily integrity, they primarily rested on the constitutional right to pri-
vacy as the basis for refusing life-sustaining treatment. Then, in 1981,
the New York Court of Appeals decided In re Storar.168 This case in-
volved facts surrounding two individuals, Brother Joseph Fox, an 83
year-old respirator patient maintained in a vegetative state, and John
Storar, a 52 year-old profoundly retarded incompetent with terminal
cancer who needed regular blood transfusions to extend his life. In up-
holding the guardians' right to refuse life-sustaining treatment for both
patients, the court specifically discussed whether the right was guaran-
teed by the constitution. However, the court ultimately refused to de-
cide the issue, holding that the right was "adequately supported by
common law (sic) principles."169 Since the Storar decision, New York
courts have continued to rely solely on the common law as a basis for
the right to refuse treatment.'
70
Since the New York decision in Storar, somewhat of a split has devel-
oped in the cases. New York and Maine 17 1 have become the two juris-
dictions which base the right to refuse treatment solely on common law
principles. All other jurisdictions recognize a federal constitutional pri-
vacy right to support such treatment refusal decisions. 172 Even New
York and Maine have not rejected the existence of such a constitutional
right. They merely have not reached the issue.
173
Yet, for the most part, the courts that have found a constitutional
166. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
167. Id. at 159.
168. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 cert. denied sub nom., Storar v.
Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
169. 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
170. See, e.g., Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d
677 (1987); Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1985); In re
Lydia E. Hall Hospital, 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
171. See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951-52 (Me. 1987).
172. Most cases which acknowledge the federal constitutional basis for the right to re-
fuse treatment also discuss the state constitutional and common law rights as well. See, e.g.,
Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179
Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40
Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984) (basing right to refuse treatment on federal consti-
tution and common law but not discussing the state constitution); Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986)
(basing right to refuse treatment on federal and state constitutions but not discussing the
common law right); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986) (recognizing federal constitutional and common law right to refuse treatment, but
not mentioning the state constitution); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (agree-
ing with states which have found a federal and common law right to forego life-sustaining
treatment); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
660 P.2d 738 (1983).
173. It may be argued that such an approach is preferred under the rule that if a court
can avoid reaching a constitutional issue, it should do so. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452
U.S. 89, 99 (1981); Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783, 785 (1974).
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basis for treatment rejection have failed to supply the necessary analysis
justifying application of the right. If the constitutional right of privacy
exists as part of the freedoms implicit in the Bill of Rights, it exists as a
protection against government interference with a fundamental privacy
interest. 174 If the government has not invaded the privacy interest, no
constitutional issue exists. For example, in an analogous area, the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution protects "[tlhe
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." However,
when a private party, acting on his own, seizes and inspects mail without
the sender's or recipient's permission, neither the fourth amendment
nor any other part of the Constitution is implicated. 17 5 The lesson is
that while a constitutional right protecting privacy may exist, without
governmental intrusion into that protected interest, no constitutional vi-
olation or issue is raised. As in the mail search example, a private, unau-
thorized search and seizure may violate the common law right to
privacy, but it does not implicate the constitution. 1
76
2. The state action issue
If courts are going to base the right to refuse life-sustaining trzat-
ment on the constitutional right of privacy, such decisions should prop-
erly include an analysis of what governmental action invaded the right.
To date, few courts have even addressed the issue. The first decision to
raise the question was the 1980 New York case of Eichner v. Dillon.1 7 7 In
deciding whether the federal constitutional right to privacy justified an
order to withdraw a respirator from an 83 year-old incompetent in a
permanent vegetative coma, the court analyzed the state action issue for
the first time. The court held that the existence of three factors was
sufficient to support a finding of state action. First, the state had implied
a threat to seek civil and criminal penalties were the respirator with-
drawn. Second, the health care providers were licensed by the state, and
their right to practice medicine might be threatened were they to discon-
tinue treatment. Finally, the court held that the state's parens patriae re-
sponsibility over incompetents was sufficient to establish the existence
of state action. Having considered these factors, the court concluded
that there was "a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the chal-
lenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself."' 7 8 This decision, however, was
174. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("zone of privacy cre-
ated by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972) ("right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters ... fundamentally affecting a person"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) ("right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state actions").
175. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
176. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir. 1976).
177. 73 A.D.2d at 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980).
178. Id. at 461, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (quotingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
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overturned in In re Storar where the higher court affirmed the order to
remove the respirator but deleted all other findings in the Eichner deci-
sion below. 1
79
The next case to explicitly consider the state action question was
Washington's first right-to-die case, In re Colyer.180 This decision in-
volved a 69 year-old comatose patient being kept alive by a respirator,
whose husband sought an order discontinuing life-sustaining treatment.
The court noted that the federal constitutional right to privacy only ex-
tended to situations involving state action.' 8 ' Adopting the test and the
factors considered in the overruled Eichner case, the court held that state
action was present and the constitutional right of privacy applied.
18 2
Exactly the same analysis and result was reached in Arizona's first right-
to-die case, Rasmussen v. Fleming, where the court cited both Eichner and
Colyer. 1
8 3
The above cases create a string of well over a dozen right-to-die
decisions based on the constitutional privacy right to refuse treatment
where either an explicit or an implicit finding of state action was made.
The three cases that directly confront the issue, Eichner, Colyer and Ras-
mussen, specifically found state action. However, two recent decisions
cast doubt on this line of cases and analysis. Both arose where plaintiffs
were seeking to impose civil liability on defendant health care providers
for providing unwanted life-sustaining treatment.
Prior to its most recent decision in the Bouvia cases, California had
consistently held that patients had a federal constitutional right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment.' 8 4 One of these earlier cases was set in the
context of Ms. Bouvia's attempts to have health care providers refrain
from providing unwanted treatment. However, in a more recent opin-
ion in which Ms. Bouvia sought attorney's fees for successfully obtaining
injunctive relief orders against her health care providers, an intermedi-
ate California appellate court retreated from earlier constitutional analy-
sis. In Bouvia II the court held:
[w]hile it is true that in both Bartling I and Bouvia II the author
of the majority opinion alluded to a constitutional basis for the
right vindicated, it seems clear that the right primarily is a de-
velopment of common law and for that reason applies to pa-
tients in private as well as governmental facilities and to
patients being treated by private as well as publicly-employed
medical practitioners.'
8 5
179. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276 (holding that the
common law right to bodily integrity was sufficient to support the treatment withdrawal
decision). See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
180. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
181. Id. at 121, 660 P.2d at 742.
182. Id.
183. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 n.9 (Ariz. 1987).
184. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297,
301; Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225.
185. Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1075, 1080, 241 Cal. Rptr.
239, 247 (1987) (citations omitted). The court also found that the way in which Ms. Bouvia
was treated did not reflect a governmental policy or custom, so the governmental entity
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The denial of fees under Ms. Bouvia's federal civil rights act claim, based
on a finding of no state action, spells trouble for her pending damage
actions claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The California court's finding of no state action in Bouvia H was
cited in the recent Colorado case of Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospi-
tal.186 In support of a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff in Ross advanced the
factors and arguments which had led to a finding of state action in
Eichner, Colyer and Rasmussen. The patient in Ross was being cared for in
a private medical facility, by private doctors, presumably, as in all three
previous cases. 18 7 The federal district court in Ross, however, came to
the opposite conclusion. Relying on several recent cases which had
found that private health care facilities and doctors were not state actors,
even though they had received federal funds, the district court granted
summary judgment against the plaintiff.' 8 8 In analyzing the state action
claim the federal district court ignored the issue of the parens patriae rela-
tionship between the patient and the state-a factor heavily relied on by
the other courts.
18 9
Trying to harmonize these different rulings is difficult. The early
right-to-die opinions were based on the constitutional right to privacy,
but failed to even address the state action issue. The New York and
Maine approach side-stepped the issue by relying on the common law
right to bodily integrity. Later right-to-die cases continued relying on
the constitutional privacy right, and a few even performed some analy-
sis, finding the requisite state action. However, as soon as plaintiffs
started to use the constitutional rights theory in order to support civil
claims against providers of unwanted treatment, the courts retreated
and found no state action. To reach such a result, the California court
actually had to ignore two prior rulings in much heralded cases.
could not be found liable. Id. at 1087-88, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 246-47 (citing Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). However, the court then
went on to add that there had not as yet been any showing that the individual defendant
doctors had violated any of plaintiff's constitutional rights and so no attorney's fees would
be assessed against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. This finding is questionable in light
of the court's decision in that there was a constitutional right to refuse treatment. See
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301. Ms. Bouvia's
attorneys, however, were awarded fees under the California private attorneys general stat-
ute for her success in Bouvia I and the lower court decision in Bouvia II. Bouvia v. County of
Los Angeles, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1086, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
186. 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
187. In Rasmussen, the patient was in a private Tucson, Arizona nursing home. In Colyer
the patient was in a religiously affiliated hospital. In Eichner the patient was in "Nassau
Hospital." In none of the decisions did the courts discuss the public or private status of
the hospitals or doctors.
188. 676 F. Supp. at 1535-37. See Annotation; Action of Private Hospital as State Action
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Fourteenth Amendment, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 463 (1979).
189. See Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 682 n.9; Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 460, 426 N.Y.S. 2d at 540.
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 120, 660 P.2d at 742; In Ross, however, the plaintiff alleged that the
patient was competent. This was contested by the defendants. Ironically, if the plaintiff in
Ross was correct, that fact theoretically might have weakened plaintiff's state action argu-
ment, since the state has no parens patrae duties with respect to competent patients. How-
ever, since the Ross patient was being treated as if he were incompetent, the net effect
should have been the same.
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Certainly, the early cases glossed over the important state action
question without the necessary analysis. Even the cases which later ad-
dressed the issue provided little in the way of reasoning. The recent
findings of no state action, however, seem equally flawed. California's
latest decision in Bouvia H contradicts the holdings in its two earlier
right-to-die cases without sufficiently considering the status of the doc-
tors who violated Ms. Bouvia's rights. The Colorado federal district
court, on the other hand, failed to appreciate, or even consider, the
unique and important parens patriae relationship between a patient at-
tempting to exercise his right to refuse treatment and his health care
providers. This issue had been the crucial factor in the earlier decisions
finding state action. To date, therefore, an adequate analysis of the is-
sue has not been performed by the courts. The future of plaintiffs'
§ 1983 damage claims and § 1988 attorney's fees claims is thus
uncertain.
3. State tort claims - the survivorship problem
Much of the future of right-to-die damage actions rests on the how
the duties of health care providers are defined and whether courts adopt
the Ohio approach or the California and New Jersey approach to the
duty issue. However, another, analytically more difficult, issue exists:
the survivability of a decedent's personal damage claim against his
health care providers.
Of the damage claims that have been brought, two cases have been
directly affected by this issue. In Leach and Bartling II, the courts dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claims for emotional and physical pain and suffer-
ing because state law precluded survival of such damage claims for the
decedent.' 9 0 In Ross, after the death of the patient, the federal court
damage action was amended to exclude all state claims. Colorado's sur-
vival statute prohibits damages for pain and suffering.19 1 In none of the
other damage actions was the issue relevant, since claims were not made
by the estate for decedent's pain and suffering. However, this was per-
haps because those claims were precluded by the applicable state sur-
vival statutes. 1
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190. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical, Center 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 969, 229
Cal. Rptr. 360, 364 (1986) ("decedent's cause of action for pain and suffering dies with
him"). Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 397, 469 N.E.2d 1047,
1052, 1054 (1983) (patient's estate may recover for battery but not for invasion of privacy
claim since privacy is a personal right which lapses with decedent's death).
191. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101(1) (1987). An issue not addressed in Ross is
whether the § 1983 claims would have been limited by the Colorado survival statute. See
Annotation, Survivability of Civil Rights Course of Action Based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 A.L.R.
Fed. 163 (1979).
192. The pending Bouvia damage claims are not affected by the California survival stat-
ute which precluded recovery for pain and suffering in Bartling II because Ms. Bouvia is
still alive. Westheart, currently pending, includes no claims for decedent's pain and suffer-
ing. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Galvin includes a battery claim on dece-
dent's behalf. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. This claim is not barred by Ohio
law, as reflected in Leach. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The Strachan case as-
serted no such claims, and while the McVey complaint did, the case was dismissed on the
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The law of the survival of actions is a patchwork of confusing and
probably outmoded rules.1 9 3 At common law if a tort victim died (from
whatever cause) before judgment was entered on his behalf, his claim
died with him. 194 This rule has been modified by statute in almost every
state, but the statutory provisions themselves greatly vary, and several
do not permit recovery for decedent's pain and suffering. 19 5 While it
has been argued that permitting such recovery would bestow a windfall
to decedent's heirs, 196 in right-to-die damage actions a countervailing
factor exists.
In cases where defendant health care providers administer un-
wanted life-sustaining treatment, the nature of the intrusion can be sig-
nificant. For example, in Bartling II, a competent and extremely ill
patient was placed on a ventilator against his will, with a tube inserted in
his throat by way of a tracheostomy. His hands were literally tied down
to prevent him from pulling out the tube, and (presumably) he was be-
ing supplied artificial nutrition through a nasogastric or gastrostomy
tube inserted into his stomach. 197 For a competent unwilling patient
such as Mr. Bartling, that kind of treatment can only be described as
torture. He was kept in this state from May 30, 1984, when he signed a
declaration demanding to be freed from what he complained was a bat-
tery, until his death, 160 days later, on November 6, 1984, when he died
with the machines still attached.' 9 8 During that entire time he was in
constant pain. Yet, because of the application of the California survival
statute, no claim could be made to recover for Mr. Bartling's
suffering. 19 9
The injustice of such a rule of law is perhaps less apparent in the
Bartling II case because it was an early right-to-die damage action where
the court held that the health care provider's duty was not clear. How-
ever, the applicability of the survival statute does not depend on the
existence of the underlying tort or the duty owed by defendants. There-
fore, if and when California law develops to the point where right-to-die
damage actions are recognized, plaintiffs will nevertheless be precluded
from claiming damages for the decedent's pain and suffering. Applica-
tion of such a statutory bar creates a terribly anomalous situation. De-
fendants may provide highly intrusive life-sustaining treatment to
duty issue without reaching the survival question. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text.
193. 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 14:4 (2d ed. 1975 and Supp.
1987).
194. See, e.g., Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607).
195. 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 194, App. A at 648-787 (setting out all state survival stat-
utes). Examples of jurisdictions with survival statutes which preclude all recovery for de-
cedents' pain and suffering include: ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (West 1975); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 573 (West 1956 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101(1) (1987); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1981). But see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-7 (1985).
196. W. PROSSER & P. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 126 (5th ed. 1984).
197. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 966, 229 Cal. Rptr.
at 361.
198. Id. at 966-67, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
199. See supra notes 193 & 196.
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unwilling patients and then automatically extinguish any potential liabil-
ity for the pain and suffering that has been caused by merely honoring
the right to refuse treatment and letting the patient die.
This macabre result is not ameliorated by allowing surviving family
members to sue on their own, since they may not have been present to
suffer the harm necessary under emotional distress theories.2 0 0 Appli-
cation of survival statutes barring actions for decedent's pain and suffer-
ing thus allows the defendants to absolutely limit liability by ceasing the
tortious behavior. Such a result is highly unusual if not unique, and cer-
tainly against public policy. However, the only solution which can be
offered at this time is for surviving family members to make pain and
suffering claims in the face of such statutes and be prepared to argue
their inapplicability or unconstitutionality as applied. 20 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Right-to-die jurisprudence has developed quickly over the last
dozen years. However, substantial uncertainties exist in the legal and
medical communities about when particular behavior is required of
health care providers. A deep reluctance exists on the part of the courts
to assess civil liability against health care providers when they are seen
as having acted in good faith to preserve life. The courts themselves
have failed to come to grips with many of the fundamental issues in-
volved and have been careless in analyzing important constitutional and
state action questions.
At some point the courts will be forced to give broader recognition
to the right-to-die damage action. If health care providers are never
held liable when they do violate the patient's right to refuse treatment,
there will never be any material incentive for them to acknowledge those
rights. Under such circumstances, health care providers would be en-
couraged to act in their own best interests and not that of their patients.
While the courts are understandably reluctant to interfere with the de-
tails of the doctor-patient relationship when basic bioethical principles
are in a state of flux, the fundamental rights of patients must be recog-
nized. Legislative action in such an area is, of course, preferred. How-
ever, living will statutes and other legislative forays into the field will
never address all of the issues. The courts, as well as the legislatures,
have a legitimate role in protecting patient rights.
200. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a) (1965).
201. Cf Rodgers v. Ferguson, 89 N.M. 688, 556 P.2d 844 (1976) (neither common law
nor survival statute applicable to bar personal injury claim of decedent brought by surviv-
ing spouse). See also Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975) (application of
survival statute held unconstitutional as violation of equal protection).
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